A negotiating agent engages in multiissue bilateral negotiation in a dynamic information-rich environment. The agent aims to make informed decisions. The agent uses maximum entropy inference and minimum relative entropy inference to construct complete distributions in its world model from sparse observation data. The agent makes no assumptions about the internals of its opponent -it focuses only on the signals that it receives.
Introduction
A Negotiating Agent, NA, engages in bilateral bargaining with an opponent, OP. It strives to make informed decisions in an information-rich environment that includes information drawn from the Internet by bots. Its design was provoked by the observation that agents are not always utility optimisers, and may not know their utility function with certainty. In the presence of realistic uncertainties, NA is more concerned making sensible, informed decisions than with attempting to optimise an unknown utility function. NA attempts to fuse the negotiation with the information generated both by and because of it. It reacts to information derived from its opponent and from the environment, and proactively seeks missing information that may be of value.
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NA draws on ideas from information theory. Game theory tells us what to do, and what outcome to expect, in many well-known negotiation situations, but these strategies and expectations are derived from assumptions about the internals of the opponent. Game theoretic analyses of bargaining are founded on the notion of agents as utility optimizers in the presence of complete and incomplete information about their opponents [9] .
NA may not have a von Neumann-Morgerstern utility function. NA makes no assumptions about the internals of OP in particular whether it has a utility function. NA does make assumptions about: the way in which the integrity of infonnation will decay, preferences that its opponent may have for some deals over others, and conditions that may lead to breakdown. It also assumes that unknown probabilities can be inferred using maximum entropy probabilistic logic [8] that is based on random worlds [4] . The maximum entropy probability distribution is "the least biased estimate possible on the given information; i.e. it is maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information" [5] . In the absence of knowledge about OP's decision-making apparatus, NA assumes that the "maximally noncommittal" model is the correct model on which to base its reasoning.
A preference relation is an assumption that NA makes about OP's preferences for s~~deals over others. For example, that she prefers to pay a lower price to a higher price. A single-issue preference relation assumes that she prefers deals on the basis of one issue alone, independent of the values of the other issues. A preference relation may be assumed prior to the negotiation, or duringit based on the offers made. For example, the opponentmay display a preference for items of a certain color; [3] describes a basis for ordering colors. The preference relations illustrated here aresingle-issue orderings, but the agent's reasoningoperates equally well with any preference relation as long as it may be expressed in Horn clauselogic.
Under some circumstances bilateral bargaining has questionable value as a trading mechanism. Bilateralbargaining is known to be inherently inefficient [10] . [1] shows that a seller is better off with an auction that attracts n + 1 buyers than bargaining with n individuals, no matter what the bargaining protocol is. [ll) shows that the weaker bargaining types will fare better in exchanges leading to a gradual migration. These resultshold for agents who aim to optimize their utilityand do limit the work described here.
2 The Negotiating Agent: NA NA operates in an information-rich environment. The integrity of its information, including informationextracted from the Internet, will decay in time. The way in which this decay occurs will depend on the type of information, and on the sourcefrom which it is drawn. Little appears to be known about how the integrity of information, suchas news-feeds, decays.
Onesource of NA's information is the signals receivedfrom OP. These include offers to NA, and the acceptance or rejection of NA's offers. If OP rejected NA's offer of $8 two days ago then what is NA's belief now in the proposition that OP will accept another offer of $8 now? Perhaps it is around 0.1. A linear model is used to model the integrity decay of these beliefs, and when the probability of a decaying belief approaches0.5 1 the belief is discarded. This choice of a linear model is independent of the-bargaining method. The model of decay could be exponential,quadratic or what ever.
1. Simultaneous, initial, binding offers from both agents;
A sequence of alternating offers, and
3. An agent quits and walks away from the negotiation.
The negotiation ceases either in the second round if one of the agents accepts a standing offer or in the final round if one agent quits and the negotiation breaks down.
Agent Architecture
Incoming messages from all sources are timestamped and placed in an "In Box", X,~they arrive. NA has a knowledge base JCand a belief set B. Each of these two sets contains statements in E; JCcontains statements that are generally true, such as 'v'x(Accept(x) 
Random worlds
Let 9 be the set of all positive ground literals that can be constructed using the predicate, function and constant symbols in E; A possible world is a valuation function v : 9 -+ {T, J.}. V denotes the set of all possible worlds; and V /C denotes the set of possible worlds that are consistent with a knowledge base /C [4].
Zorhe often-quoted oxymoron "I paid too much for it, but its worth it" attributed to Samuel Goldwyn, movie producer, illustrates Ihat intelligent agents may choose to negotiate with uncertain utility.
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A random world for /C is a probability distribu. (3)). That is, for each belief its derived sentence probability as calculated using Eqn, 1 is equal to its given sentence probability.
The entropy of a discrete random variable X with probability mass function {pd is [8]:
H(X) = -LnPn 10gPn where: Pn~0 and Ln Pn = 1. Let W {/C,B} be the "maximum en.
tropy probability distribution over V/C that is consistent with S". Given an agent with JC and B,
its derived sentence probability for any sentence, a E E, is:
Using Eqn. 2, the derived sentence probability for any belief, (3i, is equal to its given sentence probability. So the term sentence probability is used without ambiguity. Suppose that there is some level of integrity decay on these two beliefs: 0 < B({3l) < 0.5 < B(f32) < 1. Then VK; contains n + 1possible worlds ranging from "all false" to "all true" each containing n literals.
So a random world for K, will consist of n + 1 probabilities {Pi}, where, say, PI is the probability of "all true", and Pn+l is the probability of "all false". P{K:,B} will be the distribution that maximizes -EnPn 10gPn subject to the constraints: The analysis given above requires that values be specified for the opening offers l!! and w. The only part of the probability distribution that depends on the values chosen for l!! and w are the two "tails" of the distribution. So the choice of values for these two opening offers is unlikely to effect the estimates. The two tails are necessary to "soak up" the otherwise unallocated probability.
Two Issues -Without Decay
The above approach to single-issue bargaining generalizes without modification to multi-issue bargaining. it is illustrated with two issues only for ease of presentation.
The problem considered is the sale of an item with 0, ... ,4 years of warranty. The terms being negotiated specify an amount of money p and the number of years warranty w. The predicate OPAcc(w,p) now means "OP will accept the offer to purchase the good with w years warranty for $p". NA assumes the following two preference orderings. and /C contains:
As in Sec. 3.1, these sentences conveniently reduce the number of possible worlds. The number of possible worlds will be finite as long as /C contains two statements of the form: ..., OPAcc(4, a) and OPAcc(3, 13) -this is the same offer sequence as considered in Sec. 3.3 -and with a 10% decay in integrity for each time step: peOn) = 0.4, P(P12) = 0.2, P(P13) = 0.7 and P(P14) = 0.9.
Belief I3n is inconsistent with 1C U {1312} as togetherthey violate the sentence probability ordering induced by II:n and 11:12. Resolving this issue is a job for the belief revision function R which discardsthe older, and weaker, belief P11.
The distribution W {K:,B} has just five different probabilities in it. P(OPAcc(w,p) In this array, the derived sentence probabilities for the three sentences in B are shown in bold type; they are exactly their given values.
Negotiation Strategies
Sec. 3 estimated the probability distribution, P(OPAcc) , that OP will accept an offer. Estimation of the probability distribution, P(NAAcc) , that NA should be prepared to accept an offer, is not described here. These two probability distributions represent the opposing interests of the two agents NA and OP. P(OPAcc) will change everytime an offer is made, rejected or accepted. P(NAAcc) will change as the background information changes. This section discusses NA's strategy S. Sec. 4.2 considers the risk of breakdown.
Bargaining can be a game of bluff and counterbluff in which an agent may even not intend to close the deal if one should be reached. A basic conundrum in any offer-exchange bargaining is: it is impossible to force your opponent to reveal information about their position without revealinginformation about your own position. Further, by revealing information about your own position you may change your opponents position -and so on. 3 This infinite regress, of speculation and counter-speculation, is avoided here by ignoring the internals of the opponent and by focussing on what is known for certain -that is: what information is contained in the signals received and when did those signals arrive.
A fundamental principle of competitive bargaining is "never reveal your best price", and another is "never reveal your deadline -if you have one"
[13]. It is not possible to be prescriptive about what an agent should reveal. All that can be achieved is to provide strategies that an agent may choose to employ. The following are examples of such strategies.
Without Breakdown
An agent's strategy S is a function of the information It that is has at time t. That information will be represented in the agent's K and B, and will have been used to calculate P(OPAcc) and P(NAAcc) . Simple strategies choose an offer only on the basis of P(OPAcc), P(NAAcc) and a.
The greedy strategy S+ chooses I P(NAAcc(o) )~a}, it optimizes the likelihood of trade -it is a good strategy for an agent that is keen to trade without compromising its own standards of acceptability.
An approach to issue-tradeoffs is described in [3] . The bargaining strategy described there attempts to make an acceptable offer by "walking round" the iso-curve of NA 's previous offer (that has, say, an acceptability of Ona~a) towards OP's subsequent counter offer. In terms of the machinery described here, an analogue is to use the strategy 
.,Accept(S(I1))}))}).
or any number of times, optimistically working backwards on the assumption that OP will remain in the game forn rounds. The strategy s(n),
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where S(l) = S· the expected-acceptability-to-NA-optimizing strategy defined in Sec. 4. 1. S(Il) is the strategy of working back from 8 (1 (I,) 
E(Y( OjJer(S(It+J))))
where I'+1 = I, U {...,Accept(S (I,) )}. This is of little help in finding the "best" S, but two approximations are interesting.
Either replace the S in the final term by a simple strategy such as S-.
in either case the expression can be optimized numerically, even if PB is a function of
P(OPAcc(S(I,))).
The preceding considers the possibility of OP quitting.
NA may choose to quit and cause the negotiation to break down if the negotiation appears to be leading nowhere. One measure of convergence is to monitor the sequence:
max.s (P(OPAcc(5) 
the greatest likelihood of acceptable trade. If this sequence is not increasing in time to a "reasonable" value then NA may choose to quit.
Conclusions
The negotiating agent achieves its goal of reaching informed decisions whilst making no assumptions about the internals of its opponent [6] . 
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